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Tracy Gomes Appointed to Chair of ABA Transfer Pricing Committee

We are proud to congratulate our Dallas colleague, Tracy Gomes, McDermott’s chief economist in transfer pricing, upon his appointment as chair of the American Bar Association Transfer Pricing Committee.  This position provides the opportunity to propose issues and comments, and to have access to US tax officials in the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department as part of the ABA’s leadership committee.  It expands upon McDermott’s already substantial knowledge, reputation and experience in the transfer pricing arena—an increasingly important area of IRS attention and focus.

This appointment reflects recognition of McDermott’s professionals as thought leaders in transfer pricing, as well as our commitment to furthering the collective knowledge-base, understanding and application of reasoned and cogent tax administration, and role in the shaping of tax policies, particularly in light of the changing international tax rules brought about by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) action items.




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Update on APA Challenges to Notice of Deficiency

In an earlier blog post, we discussed the US Tax Court’s ruling in QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 14122-13 (Dec. 27, 2013). The taxpayer had argued that the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’) notice of deficiency containing a one-sentence reason for the deficiency determination violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The Tax Court disagreed, emphasizing that it was well settled that the court is not subject to the APA. To refresh, the APA provides a general rule that a reviewing court that is subject to the APA must hold unlawful and set aside an agency action unwarranted by the facts to the extent the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. (more…)




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Update on Deference to IRS Positions

As we discussed here, and in our recent article in The Federal Lawyer, deference to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pronouncement is an important issue for taxpayers and their advisors. Our prior writings dealt generally with the three levels of deference in tax cases and how they have been applied by the courts. A recent Tax Court case looks at the level of deference owed to statements in preambles to tax regulations.

In Estate of Morrissette v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. No. 11 (Apr. 13, 2016), the taxpayer cited to the preamble to regulations dealing with split-dollar life insurance arrangements. Those regulations dealt with two mutually exclusive regimes for taxing these types of arrangements entered into after September 17, 2013. The preamble to the regulations included an example that was structurally identical to the arrangements at issue in the Tax Court case. In reviewing the preamble, the court noted that while it had previously been unpersuaded by a preamble, it believed that the preamble was a statement of the IRS’s interpretation of the statute and therefore should be judged under the “power to persuade” standard in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944). The Tax Court found that the preamble was consistent with the taxpayer’s interpretation of the statute and contrary to the IRS’s position, and found the logic of the preamble to be sound.

The Tax Court’s statements regarding Skidmore deference are important for taxpayers, both in planning and defending transactions. In prior cases, the Tax Court has held that the IRS is “obligated to follow” its “published administrative position” and treated such positions as a concession as to the proper result, e.g., Dixon v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 173, 188 (2013). A preamble to a regulation could be viewed as a published administrative position, given that it is part of a Treasury Decision that is published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and the IRS’s position is that the Internal Revenue Bulletin is the “authoritative instrument of the Commissioner.” Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d). It is unclear whether the taxpayer in Estate of Morrissette argued that the IRS was obligated to follow the preamble.

Taxpayers that wish to rely on preambles to regulations, or that are defending against an IRS position based on a preamble, need to be aware of these arguments in planning and defending their transactions. To the extent the preamble is supportive of a position and contains a persuasive and sound analysis, one could argue that Skidmore deference applies. Under this argument, the IRS should not be able to disavow its interpretation of a statute or regulation. Additionally, taxpayers may wish to argue that under the principle announced in Dixon and prior Tax Court cases, the statements in a preamble constitute a concession by the IRS to which it is bound. A similar analysis should be undertaken if the preamble is contrary to the taxpayer’s position.




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Senate Finance Committee Approves Tax Court Nominees Copeland and Stoll

Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) issued an April 18, 2016 statement noting the committee’s approval of Tax Court nominees Elizabeth Copeland and Vik Stoll.  In 2015, President Obama nominated Copeland and Stoll to be judges at the US Tax Court.

Copeland is a partner at the law firm Strasburger & Price, LLP. If confirmed, she will be assuming the position left vacant by the 2014 retirement of Judge Diane L. Kroupa.

Stoll is Deputy Chief Administrative Officer and Director of Collections for Jackson County, Missouri. If confirmed, he will be assuming the position left vacant by Judge James S. Halpern, who took senior status in late 2015.




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Tax Court Rules Whether IRS’s Transfer Pricing Adjustments Are Arbitrary, Capricious Depends on Facts and Circumstances

In Guidant LLC f.k.a. Guidant Corporation, and Subsidiaries, et al. v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. No. 5 (Feb. 29, 2016), the taxpayer filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on the ground that the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) transfer pricing adjustments were “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” as a matter of law. Judge David Laro denied the motion, ruling that “whether the Commissioner abused his discretion … depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case.” The taxpayer’s motion thus presented “a question of fact that should be resolved on the basis of the trial record.”

The case involves transfer pricing adjustments under Section 482 that increased the income of Guidant Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries by nearly $3.5 billion. Section 482 grants the IRS broad discretion to “distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances” between or among controlled enterprises if it determines that such a re-allocation is “necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income” of any of the enterprises. A taxpayer that challenges a Section 482 adjustment has a “dual burden.” First, it must show that the IRS’s adjustments are “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” The taxpayer must then show that its intercompany transactions reflect arm’s-length dealing. (more…)




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Ax v. Commissioner: The Tax Court Reaffirms that It Is Not Subject to the APA

On April 11, 2016, the US Tax Court issued its T.C. opinion in Ax v. Commissioner.  The notice of deficiency in the case determined that certain premium payments made to a captive insurance company were not established by the taxpayer to be (1) insurance expenses and (2) paid.  But this is not a run of the mill captive insurance case—at least not yet.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) moved for leave to amend its answer in the case to assert additionally that (1) the taxpayers’ captive insurance arrangement lacked economic substance and (2) amounts paid as premiums were neither ordinary nor necessary (and to allege facts in support of both assertions).  The taxpayers opposed, citing Mayo Foundation for Med. & Educ. Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), and arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943) barred the IRS from “raising new grounds to support [the IRS’s] final agency action beyond those grounds originally stated in the notice of final agency action.”  The taxpayers also argued that the IRS’s new assertions constituted “new matters” that did not meet required heightened pleading standards under the Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.  Ultimately, the Tax Court sided with the IRS.

(more…)




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Tax Court Amends Evidence Rules

On March 28, 2016, the U.S. Tax Court announced interim changes to its Rule of Practice and Procedure to incorporate changes made by Congress at the end of 2015.  The interim changes impact several areas of the Tax Court’s Rules, including the impact of bankruptcy proceedings on the court’s jurisdiction, actions for review of failure to abate interest,  partnership actions and jurisdiction related to passport certification actions.  Additionally, the changes amend the rule regarding the application of the rules of evidence in Tax Court proceedings, which is summarized below.

Pursuant to IRC § 7453, the Tax Court has historically followed the rules of evidence as applied by the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in trials without a jury.  Congress’s recent amendment to IRC § 7453 removed the reference to the rules of the United States District Court of the District of Columbia, and added a reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

To incorporate Congress’s change, the Tax Court amended Rule 143 regarding evidence that is effective immediately and a final proposed amendment that is subject to public comment.  Tax Court Rule 143 now states that:

Trials before the court will be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The amendment applies to all proceedings commenced after December 18, 2015, and also applies to all other proceedings pending on that date to the extent it is just and practicable.

The effect of the amendment to IRC § 7453 and Tax Court Rule 143 is to extend the so-called Golsen rule (named for Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971)) to evidence issues.  Pursuant to this rule, the Tax Court chooses to follow the case law of the circuit to which a case is properly appealed.  In prior cases and unpublished orders, the Tax Court had cited to both D.C. Circuit opinions and opinions of the circuit where any appeal in the specific case would normally lie in deciding evidentiary issues.  This change may cause controversy where there is a split in the circuits on a particular evidence issue, for example in the case of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.  However, the change ensures that, as with other legal issues presented, the court will follow the law of the circuit to which the case is appealable.




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Deference Principles in Tax Cases and the Unique Challenges of Auer Deference

The Federal Lawyer recently published an article we wrote which discusses how deference principles are applied in tax cases. The article can be accessed here. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), confirmed that tax laws are subject to the same deference principles as other federal laws.

In general, these deference principles can be grouped into three levels, commonly referred to as Chevron, Skidmore, and Auer deference.  Chevron is often regarded as the strongest level of deference, and can apply where Congress explicitly leaves a gap for an agency to fill and the agency intends for its interpretation to have the force of law. Tax regulations can be entitled to Chevron deference. Skidmore deference, which is limited to an interpretation’s persuasive power, can apply to other IRS interpretations that are thoroughly considered, well-reasoned, and consistent with earlier and later IRS pronouncements.  Skidmore deference, which is generally considered a lesser level of deference than Chevron, can apply to revenue rulings and revenue procedures. The last level of deference, Auer, is a special level of deference that can apply when an agency interprets its own regulations. In Auer v. Robbins, U.S. 452, 461 (1997), the Supreme Court accorded deference to an agency’s amicus brief. The theory behind Auer is that an agency is uniquely positioned to interpret any ambiguity in its own regulations.  Courts have increasingly placed limitations on Auer and its continuing validity has been questioned by sitting members of the Supreme Court.

When we wrote the article, Justice Scalia was the leading member of the Supreme Court advocating for the abandonment of Auer. But he was not alone. Other justices have openly either written about the risks of Auer or indicated a willingness to reconsider the principles of Auer. In addition, all current justices have either written or joined in an opinion that casts serious doubts about Auer or expressed an indication to revisit the deference standard in an appropriate case. With Justice Scalia’s passing, it remains to be seen whether the Court will continue to seek such a case. But considering the increasing wave of limitations being placed on Auer, it would not come as a surprise if further limitations were issued.




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IRS Updates Appeals Procedures for Tax Court Cases

On March 23, 2016, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Rev. Proc. 2016-22, 2016-15 IRB 1, which clarifies and describes the practices for the administrative appeals process in cases docketed in the Tax Court.  The stated purpose of the revenue procedure is to facilitate effective utilization of appeals and to achieve earlier development and resolution of Tax Court cases.

Previously, the procedures for the appeals process of Tax Court cases was contained in Rev. Proc. 87-24, 1987-1 C.B. 720.  In October 2015, the IRS released a proposed revenue procedure updating the rules and requesting public comments.  Three substantive comments were received and considered by the IRS, resulting in changes to the proposed revenue procedure.  Rev. Proc. 2016-22 states that some of the suggestions that were not adopted may be addressed in other IRS guidance materials.

The general rule followed by the IRS is that all cases docketed in the Tax Court that have not previously been considered by IRS Appeals will be transferred to Appeals unless the taxpayer notifies IRS counsel that it wants to forego settlement consideration by Appeals.  This rule is subject to certain exceptions, most notably if the case has been designated for litigation by the IRS.  The revenue procedure also provides that “[i]n limited circumstances, a docketed case or issue will not be referred if Division Counsel or a higher level Counsel official determines that referral is not in the interest of sound tax administration.”  Although no definition is provided, examples are provided of: (1) a case involving a significant issue common to other cases in litigation for which the IRS maintains a consistent position; or (2) cases related to a case over which the Department of Justice has jurisdiction.  Referral to IRS Appeals will generally occur within 30 days of the case becoming at issue in the Tax Court, which can be either the date the Answer is filed by the IRS or a Reply (if required) is filed by the taxpayer.

The revenue procedure clarifies, and limits, the role of IRS counsel when a case is referred to Appeals.  Unlike Rev. Proc. 87-24, the new revenue procedure provides that Appeals has sole discretion to determine whether IRS counsel may participate in any settlement conference and will consider input from the taxpayer on this point.  It also clarifies that when a case is forwarded to Appeals for consideration, “Appeals has the sole authority to resolve the case through settlement until the case is returned to Counsel.”  In the past, taxpayers were concerned about the ability of IRS counsel to disrupt a settlement reached with Appeals.  If a settlement is reached with Appeals, IRS counsel’s involvement is ministerial in that counsel should only review any decision document signed by the taxpayer for accuracy and completeness before signing the decision document on behalf of the IRS and filing it with the Tax Court.

The new revenue procedure should also be a welcome development for estate tax cases given that there is no statutory provision to extend the [...]

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