Court Procedure Matters Archives - Page 14 of 34

Court Procedure Matters

President Trump Nominates Copeland and Urda to US Tax Court

by Jeffrey M. Glassman, Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Aug 7, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On August 3, 2017, President Donald Trump nominated two judges to the US Tax Court. The nominations were received in the US Senate (Senate) and referred to the Committee on Finance.

One of the nominees, Elizabeth Copeland, was previously nominated by President Barack Obama. Her previous nomination expired with the conclusion of the 114th Congress in January 2017. The Committee on Finance unanimously approved her previous nomination, but the nomination was never voted on by the full Senate. Copeland is a partner at the law firm Strasburger & Price, LLP. If confirmed, she will be assuming the position left vacant by the 2015 retirement of Judge James S. Halpern. Judge Halpern still performs judicial duties as a Senior Judge on recall.

The second nominee, Patrick Urda, is counsel to the deputy assistant attorney general in the US Department of Justice’s Tax Division. If confirmed, he will be assuming the position left vacant by the 2014 retirement of Judge Diane L. Kroupa. We previously covered the circumstances of Judge Kroupa’s retirement and related criminal proceedings.

Senate Attempts to Repeal Chevron Deference

by Macdonald Norman and Robin L. Greenhouse | Jul 31, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 US 837 (1984), the Supreme Court of the United States established a framework for assessing an agency’s interpretation of statutory provisions. First, a reviewing court must ask whether Congress “delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” and whether the agency’s interpretation was promulgated under that authority. United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 US 218, 226–27 (2001). Delegation may be shown in a variety of ways, including “an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” Id. at 227. If an agency has been delegated the requisite authority, the analysis is segmented into two steps.

Under step one, the reviewing court asks whether Congress has clearly spoken on the precise question at issue. See Chevron, 467 US at 842. If so, both the court and agency must follow the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” and the inquiry ends. Id. at 842–43.

If the statute under review is ambiguous or silent, the reviewing court moves to step two: whether the agency’s interpretation is based on “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842. This inquiry asks whether the interpretation is reasonable and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 US at 843; see also Judulang v. Holder, 565 US 42, 53 n.7 (2011); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 US ____, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). If the agency’s interpretation passes muster, then the agency’s interpretation is given Chevron deference, and afforded the force of law. The Chevron two-part analysis applies to tax regulations issued by the United States Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 562 US 44, 55 (2011). (more…)

Tax Court Hands Eaton a Complete Victory on the Cancellation of its Advance Pricing Agreements

by Robin L. Greenhouse | Jul 28, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, IRS Guidance, Transfer Pricing Resource, Uncategorized

On July 26, 2017, the United States Tax Court (Tax Court) handed a complete victory to Eaton Corporation (Eaton) relating to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) cancellation of two Advance Pricing Agreements (APA). Eaton Corporation v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2017-147. The Tax Court held that the IRS had abused its discretion in cancelling the two successive unilateral APAs entered into by Eaton and its subsidiaries with respect to the manufacturing of circuit breaker products in Puerto Rico, and it found no transfer of any intangibles subject to Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 367(d). In 2011, the IRS cancelled Eaton’s first APA effective January 1, 2005, and the renewal APA effective January 1, 2006, on the ground that Eaton had made numerous material misrepresentations during the negotiations of the APAs and during the implementation of the APAs. As a result of the APA cancellations, the IRS issued notice of deficiencies for 2005 and 2006 determining that a transfer pricing adjustment under Code Section 482 was necessary to reflect the arm’s-length result for the related party transactions. Eaton disputed the deficiency determinations, contending that the IRS abused its discretion in cancelling the two APAs.

The Tax Court considered whether Eaton made misrepresentations during the negotiations or the implementation. With respect to the APA negotiations, the court established the standard for misrepresentation as “false or misleading, usually with an intent to deceive, and relate to the terms of the APA.” Based on the evidence of the negotiations presented at trial, the court concluded that there were no grounds for cancellation of the APAs; “Eaton’s evidence that it answered all questions asked and turned over all requested material is uncontradicted.” Additionally, the court rejected the IRS’s contention that more information was needed; “The negotiation process for these APAs was long and thorough.” Thus, the IRS “had enough material to decide not to agree to the APAs or to reject petitioner’s proposed TPM and suggest another APA. Cancelling the APAs on the grounds related to the APA negotiations was arbitrary.” (more…)

John Doe Intervenes in Virtual Currency Summons Enforcement Case

by Robin L. Greenhouse | Jul 21, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, IRS Audits, IRS Guidance, Uncategorized

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has broad authority under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 7602 to issue administrative summonses to taxpayers and third parties to gather information to ascertain the correctness of any return. If the IRS does not know the identity of the parties whose records are covered by the summons, the IRS may issue a “John Doe” summons only upon receipt of a court order. The court will issue the order if the IRS has satisfied the three criteria provided in IRC Section 7609(f):

The summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class of persons,
There is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal revenue law, and
The information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.

(more…)

Third Circuit Upholds One Deduction Tax Court Ruling

by Michael J. Wilder | Jun 30, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Uncategorized

In Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 3d Cir., No. 14-01743 (June 29, 2017), the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a Tax Court decision that disallowed a second deduction for the same economic loss claimed by a consolidated group with respect to stock of a member. The court concluded that the “loss duplication” regulations for member stock in effect at the time of the transaction were sufficiently clear to disallow the second deduction. Although the result is not surprising, the case is noteworthy because it extensively discusses the Ilfeld doctrine (double deductions cannot be claimed for the same economic loss in the absence of clear authorization under the language of the Code or regulations), and implies that the doctrine may be limited to consolidated return issues.

The Bruins Score! Court Rules Away from Home Meals Are 100 Percent Deductible

by Kevin Spencer and Ruth Wimer | Jun 28, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

In a surprising decision, the US Tax Court (Tax Court) concluded that the pregame away-city meals provided to the Boston Bruins hockey team was not subject to the 50 percent deduction disallowance on the basis that the meals were both for the “convenience of the employer” and were provided at an “employer operated eating facility.” In Jacobs v. Commissioner, 148 TC No 24 (June 26, 2017), the court found that meals—consisting of dinner, breakfast, lunch and snacks—were served in a room provided without charge by the hotel and to all employees of the Bruins traveling to the games.

Most businesses are well aware of the 50 percent deduction disallowance provided in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 274(n)(1), which applies to meals provided to executives or other employees traveling for the business purpose of the employer. “De-minimis” meals (those which are provided infrequently and low in value), however, are excepted from the 50 percent disallowance. Also exempt are those meals provided at employer-operated eating facilities, (e.g., the company cafeteria) and meeting the following requirements:

the facility is located on or near the business premises of the employer;
the revenue derived from the facility normally equals or exceeds the direct operating costs of the facility; and
the facility is available on substantially the same terms to each member of a group of employees that is defined under a reasonable classification which does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.

IRC Section 119(a) allows an employee to exclude the value of any meals furnished by or on behalf of his employer if the meals are furnished on the employer’s business premise for the convenience of the employer. Generally, the expenses of IRC Section 119 meals can be used to satisfy the requirement that the revenue from the eating facility equal direct operating costs.

In Jacobs, the Tax Court concluded that the group meals served in the away-city hotel rooms provided at the hotels where the Bruins hockey team stayed for the games was an “employer operated eating facility,” which deems the rooms as the “eating facility” and “on the business premises of the employer” for purposes of the requirements. The rooms were also considered the business premises of the employer for purposes of the IRC Section 119 requirement. In light of its holding, the Tax Court did not need to address the taxpayer’s alternative argument that the meals were expenses for entertainment sold to customers under IRC Section 274(n)(2)(A).

Practice Point: The decision in Jacobs is seemingly expansive in permitting employers to deduct meals provided away from what has traditionally been considered an employer facility. The decision may provide an opportunity to employers to seek additional expense deductions.

Tax Court Considering Requiring Notice of Non-Party Subpoenas

by McDermott Will & Emery | Jun 26, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

We previously wrote about the lack of a US Tax Court (Tax Court) rule requiring notice to other parties before service of non-party subpoenas for the production of documents, information, or tangible things and inconsistent practices for Judges at the Tax Court. See here and here. To recap, Tax Court Rule 147 allows a party to issue a subpoena to a non-party but does not require that prior notice be given to the other side of the issuance. Prior notice is required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern federal cases before the US district courts. As previously discussed, this absence of a Tax Court rule has led to inconsistent orders from the Tax Court on the subject.

Change may be coming soon, according to comments from Tax Court Chief Judge Marvel on June 16, 2017 at the New York University School of Professional Studies Tax Controversy Forum. Judge Marvel indicated that the Tax Court is considering amendments to Tax Court Rule 147 to conform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This would be a welcome development for taxpayers, as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would no longer be able to issue subpoenas and gather information from non-parties without a taxpayer’s knowledge and access to the same materials.

Practice Point: The Tax Court has not indicated when the next amendments to its Rules will be released. Until that time, taxpayers in litigation should not expect that the IRS will provide notice of subpoenas issued to non-parties. As we have pointed out before, taxpayers should routinely and regularly issue discovery requests on the IRS seeking: (1) a list of all third-party contacts, including the documents sent and received; (2) copies of all subpoenas, including a copy of all documents sent and received; and (3) a list of the dates on which the third-party contacts occurred, including phone calls and meetings. These requests should be made at the beginning of every case, and it should be stated that the requests are continuing in nature.

Canadian Tax Court Holds that Agreements Reached Under the Mutual Agreement Procedure are Binding on the Canada Revenue Agency

by K. Christy Vouri-Misso and Steven Hannes | May 9, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On March 10, 2017, the Tax Court of Canada held that agreements reached under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) precluded the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) from redetermining the transfer prices of rock salt sold by Sifto Canada Corp. (Sifto Canada) to a related party in the United States.

In 2006, Sifto Canada reevaluated the transfer pricing of its rock salt sales to its US affiliate for 2002 through 2006. Siftco Canada discovered that the sales prices had been for less than an arm’s length price and in 2007 made an application to the CRA’s voluntary disclosure program reporting additional income from the sale of rock salt for 2002-2006 of over C$13 million. In 2008, the CRA accepted the application and assessed additional tax on that income.

After the assessment, Sifto Canada applied to the Canadian Competent Authority (CCA) and its US affiliate applied to the United States Competent Authority (USCA) for relief from double taxation under Articles IX and XXVI of the Convention between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, as amended (the Treaty). The CRA did not audit Sifto Canada during this time and based its position paper on Sifto Canada’s voluntary disclosure application. Under the MAP process, the USCA and CCA then agreed to the transfer prices.

During the negotiation process for the MAP, the CRA began auditing the transfer prices of the rock salt for those years and then, subsequent to the signing of the MAP agreements, the CRA determined that the transfer prices should have been even higher than the amounts reported by Sifto Canada in the voluntary disclosure and issued further reassessments of its tax.

The CRA argued that: (1) the MAP agreements only provided relief from double taxation and did not set transfer prices; (2) the CCA only entered into agreements with the USCA and did not enter into a binding agreement with Sifto Canada regarding the transfer prices; and (3) that the government had a duty to reassess the tax once it determined that the transfer prices were not at arm’s length.

The Tax Court of Canada did not agree with the CRA and held the government to its MAP agreements. The Court found that by reaching an agreement under the MAP process, the CCA necessarily had to find that the transfer prices were at arm’s length under the Treaty. Further, the Court found that under the factual matrix of this case, the CCA’s letters exchanged with Siftco Canada clearly described the terms of the MAP agreements, asked Siftco Canada to accept those terms, and Sifto Canada then accepted the terms establishing a binding agreement. Finally, the Court found the agreements were not “indefensible on the facts and the law” and thus were binding on the Canadian government.

Practice Point: This case is helpful to taxpayers with cross-border transactions between the US and Canada and demonstrates that MAP agreements are binding on the CRA.

Taxpayer Rights Around the World (Follow-Up)

by McDermott Will & Emery | May 4, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, IRS Guidance, Transfer Pricing Resource, Uncategorized

We previously wrote two blog posts about the 2nd International Conference on Taxpayer Rights held in Vienna, Austria in March 2017 here and here. Videos of each panel discussion are now available for viewing here. Planning is currently underway for the 3rd International Conference on Taxpayer Rights, which will be held in The Netherlands on May 3-4.

The IRS’s Assault on Section 199 (Computer Software) Doesn’t Compute

by Jean A. Pawlow, Kevin Spencer and Robin L. Greenhouse | Apr 24, 2017 | Court Procedure Matters, IRS Appeals, IRS Audits, IRS Guidance, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

Internal Revenue Code Section 199 permits taxpayers to claim a 9 percent deduction related to the costs to develop software within the U.S. The relevant regulations and their interpretation, however, place substantial restrictions on claiming the benefit.

Moreover, the regulations and the government’s position haven’t kept up with the technological advances in computer software.

Before claiming the deduction on your return, consider that the Internal Revenue Service has this issue within its sights, and perhaps it will be the subject of one of their new “campaigns.”

In 2004, Congress enacted I.R.C. Section 199 to tip the scales of global competitiveness more in favor of American business. The main motivation of the statute was to create jobs by encouraging businesses to manufacture and produce their products in the U.S. The tax benefit, however, isn’t available for services, a theme that pervades many of the provisions in the statute and regulations.

Originally published in Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report – April 24, 2017 – Number 77